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The paper examines a financial accelerator mechanism in analyzing determinants of corporate 
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with firm size. There is also evidence that monetary policy has a stronger effect on 
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1. Introduction 
An accurate understanding of monetary policy transmission is key for efficient 
implementation of monetary policy. While there is considerable empirical evidence on the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism in the Euro area (see Angeloni, Kashyap, and 
Mojon 2003), there is a lack of knowledge about the transmission mechanism in the European 
Union’s new member states, those acceding to the EU in 2004. This is striking for various 
reasons, especially considering that many of these economies are likely to join the Euro area 
in the very near future and thus be subject to common monetary policy. This paper aims to 
bridge this knowledge gap by providing empirical evidence on the balance sheet channel in 
one such new EU member, the Czech Republic. 
 
Given the assumption of imperfect capital markets (in view of information asymmetries 
and/or contract enforcement problems), there is a wedge between the costs of internal and 
external financing. The balance sheet channel links the cost of external finance to the financial 
position of the borrower.
1 As a result, under contractionary shock, a firm’s internal sources of 
funding typically worsen and the firm becomes more dependent on external finance. 
However, at the same time, the cost of external financing has a tendency to increase as the 
financial health of a borrower weakens. A greater dependence on external funding at a time 
when the cost of borrowing has increased has been characterized as a “financial accelerator 
effect” (Bernanke et al. 1999). In consequence, corporate financial positions––balance sheet 
strength––amplifies output fluctuations (Bernanke and Gertler 1989).  
 
According to Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), monetary policy might have asymmetric effects 
                                                             
1 Calstrom and Fuerst (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Bernanke et al. (1999) all model interactions 
between borrowing costs and the financial position of borrower.    3
over the business cycle; that is, it is more powerful in downturns than in booms.
2 In addition, 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Oliner and Rudebush (1996) suggest that monetary policy 
shocks have stronger effects on smaller firms than on larger firms as a result of unequal 
access to external financing. Boissay (2001) suggests that financial accelerator effects might 
be particularly strong during periods of credit rationing. 
 
In this paper, we examine the aforementioned suppositions using a large dataset comprised of 
the financial statements of Czech firms from 1996 to 2002. We study if balance sheet position 
affects the interest rates firms are charged; we analyze the extent to which balance sheet 
positions are procyclical; and we investigate if monetary policy has heterogeneous effects, 
particularly as regards small firms and during periods of economic downturns.   
 
As such, we seek to add to the existing evidence on corporate investment dynamics in the 
Czech Republic (Lizal and Svejnar 2002a, Lizal and Svejnar 2002b, Konings et al. 2003, 
Hanousek and Filler 2004). In general, these studies examine the role of ownership, credit 
rationing, and soft-budget constraints. While they provide important insights into the nature of 
Czech firms’ investment dynamics, they typically employ data from the mid-1990s. More 
recently, Pruteanu (2004a) analyses whether banks credit rationed Czech enterprises during 
1997–2002.   
 
Typically, econometric studies investigating financial accelerator effects analyze corporate 
investment dynamics (see Vermeulen 2002 or Berg et al., 2004). Few studies have focused on 
                                                             
2 See also Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994). Another stream of literature highlights, toward obtaining the 
asymmetric effects of monetary policy, the role of downward price rigidity; see, for example, Ball and Mankiw 
(1994). Nevertheless, recent empirical evidence from Euro area countries tends to challenge the assumption of 
downward price rigidity (Dhyne et al. 2005).    4
the determinants of corporate interest rates within the financial accelerator framework. Mojon, 
Smets, and Vermeulen (2002) inter alia analyze corporate interest rate dynamics in the four 
largest Euro-area countries in an error-correction context. They find that firm characteristics 
influence the interest rates firms are charged. In contrast to our results, they find little 
evidence that monetary policy in these countries has a heterogeneous impact on firms and/or 
over the business cycle. Benito and Whitley (2003) study the factors affecting corporate 
interest rates in the United Kingdom in a dynamic setting, and their results also indicate that 
firms’ balance sheets are indeed an important determinant of corporate interest rates. In our 
paper, however, we apply a slightly different estimation strategy than these two studies.  
 
In addition, we add to the scarce literature on monetary policy transmission in the Czech 
Republic. To our knowledge, this issue is studied systematically at the micro level only by 
Pruteanu (2004b) and Schmitz (2004).
3 Pruteanu focuses on the bank lending channel. She 
finds that monetary policy affects the growth rate of loans more strongly in 1999–2001 than 
in 1996–98. In addition, there is certain evidence that monetary policy had heterogeneous 
effects on bank lending in 1999–2001. Similarly, Schmitz studies the role of banks in 
monetary policy transmission in several new EU members over the period 1990–2001, and 
while bank lending reacts significantly to monetary policy tightening, she finds no evidence 
of heterogeneity in monetary policy effects.
4  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the description of our dataset as well as 
                                                             
3 At the macro level, Arnostova and Hurnik (2005) study the monetary transmission mechanism in the Czech 
economy using vector autoregression analysis.   
4 However note that Schmitz’s sample begins already in 1990. Interest rate ceilings were in use then, and vast 
majority of banks were still state owned.   5
our estimation methodology. In Section 3, we present the descriptive statistics and regression 
analysis. We conclude in Section 4. Finally, Appendix offers detailed descriptions of the 
variables.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
The data employed for our aggregate level analysis are derived from the ARAD public 
database operated by the Czech National Bank (CNB). The data for the aggregate analysis 
includes debt outstanding and interest rates. Both variables are coded, according to their 
maturity, as short, medium, or long term (see Appendix for details). Primarily, we use this 
data to estimate a representative aggregate interest rate for a comparison with sample 
corporate interest rates.    
 
Data for the corporate level analysis are obtained from company records compiled by the 
Čekia Agency, a Czech provider of business information services, as a part of their Magnus 
dataset. Originally, the unbalanced panel dataset incorporates the year-end financial 
statements of 461 non-financial companies from 1993 to 2002. Balance sheets and profit and 
loss accounts are available for each firm. The dataset also contains a detailed description of 
the economic activity of each firm. Using this information, we divide the companies into 
fifteen industries, as classified by the Czech Statistical Office: agriculture, food production, 
beverage and tobacco production, mining and processing of minerals and ors, textile and 
leather production, wood processing and paper production, chemical and pharmaceutics and 
rubber production, construction, metallurgy, machine building, electronics, power 
engineering, transportation, commerce, and glass and pottery.    6
 
As a prelude to our estimation, we excluded firm records that appeared to contain 
inconsistencies. The first consistency check was simply to examine if the data takes on the 
expected values. For example, the value of a firm’s assets should be positive. Analogously, 
the ratio of various items from the financial statements should exhibit the expected values. 
For instance, the ratio of liquid assets to assets or of debt to assets should lie between zero and 
one. On this basis, we excluded six firms from the sample.  
 
Subsequently, there were only three firm records in the dataset available for 1993, two for 
1994, and six for 1995. We therefore only used company records from the period 1996–2002. 
The majority of observations are from 1999–2002. While the dataset for 1996, 1997, and 1998 
contain 17, 39, and 81 firms, respectively, the number of firms for 1999–2002 exceeds 300. 
Namely, there are 309, 390, 362, and 305 firms for the years 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002, 
respectively. In total, the unbalanced sample counts for 1494 observations from 448 firms. 
Typically, we are able to track at least three subsequent years of the records for a given firm.  
 
2.2 Estimation Methodology 
 
We first link the interest rate charged to balance sheet position, which is approximated by the 
extent of leverage, liquidity, market access, and collateral value. We also analyze whether 
small firms pay higher interest rates on average, and also if corporate interest rates increase 
during a downturn. Next, we examine if monetary policy has hetererogeneous effects on firms 
according to firm size. Finally, we investigate whether monetary policy affects corporate 
interest rates more strongly during a downturn. 
   7
First, we estimate the equation (1) linking balance sheet indicators to corporate interest rates: 
 
  it i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i it e u ACCESS A CF A DEBT A COLL IR + + + + + + = , 5 , , 4 , , 3 , , 2 1 / / / α α α α α .                   (1) 
 
The dependent variable,  it IR , represents the corporate interest rate paid by the i-th firm at 
time t, computed from the firm’s financial statements (as the ratio of interest rate expenses to 
total debt).
5 The variable  it COLL  stands for firm collateral. it DEBT  is the company net debt. 
The cash flow generated is  it CF .
6 The variables  it COLL ,  it DEBT , and it CF  are normalized 
by it A , which is i-th firm assets at time t. The extent of short-term financing is captured 
by it ACCESS , which stands as the proxy for assessing the degree of market access of i-th firm 
at time t. This is calculated as one minus the ratio of short-term debt to total debt. 
Furthermore,  i u  is an unobserved firm fixed effect, and  tt e  is the error term. A detailed 
                                                             
5 Benito and Whitley (2003) discuss the drawbacks this measure of corporate interest rates may eventually have. 
If a firm reduces the amount of its debt substantially in the course of a financial year, the resulting measure of 
corporate interest rates based on year-end balance sheets may be “artificially” high. To address the empirical 
relevance of this issue, we examine a correlation of our measure of interest rates and aggregate interest rates. In 
addition, we estimate the equations without outliers, excluding 5 percent of the lowest and highest interest rates 
(not reported). The empirical results suggest that this issue is only of limited relevance in our sample. The 
obvious advantage of using this measure of interest rates is that it provides large cross-sectional information, 
which is otherwise hardly available. 
 
In addition, if firm does not rely on external financing, its interest rate expenses as well as our measure of 
corporate interest rates are zero. Note that there are only 6 such observations out of 1494 in our dataset.  
6 An alternative indicator of liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to assets. In our sample, the correlation of liquid 
assets and cash flow (both normalized by assets) is 0.76. In consequence, we do not report the results with liquid 
assets, as the results are qualitatively very similar.   8
derivation of the variables is presented in Appendix. 
 
The sign of  2 α  is expected to be negative. A firm with greater collateral value is likely to be 
charged a lower interest rate, as collateral secures debt (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997). Estimated 
3 α  should yield a positive sign. More leveraged firms are in general more likely to default, 
and thus the lender seeks to be compensated by a higher interest rate. The sign of  4 α  should 
be negative, as more liquid firms are likely to be charged lower interest rates. Firms with 
better access to external funds are likely to encounter lower interest rates. The underlying 
supposition is that more risky firms are unable to receive long-term finance, and are thus 
forced to finance their projects with short-term debt (Bougheas et al. 2006). Thus,  5 α  is 
expected to be negative. 
 
Additionally, we investigate if the interest rates charged are typically higher for small firms 
and/or during economic downturns. For convenience, balance sheet indicators ( it it A COLL /,  
it it A DEBT /,   it it A CF /  and  it ACCESS ) are labeled as it X  thereafter.  
 
In addition to Equation (1), we include two dummy variables in Equation (2): 
 
it i i t t i it e u S RECESSION X IR + + + + + = 4 3 , 2 1 β β β β .                                                (2) 
 
The  t RECESSION  dummy captures whether the country records negative growth rates in 
time t. The variable  i S  is a dummy to assess whether small firms typically encounter higher 
interest rates.   
   9
We expect  3 β  to be positive for several reasons. Banks may, for example, contract their 
lending during a downturn. Similarly,  4 β  is likely to be positive, because small firms are 
more risky and/or entail greater agency costs for borrowers (Bernanke and Gertler 1990).  
 
Next, we examine whether there is heterogeneity in the effects of monetary policy. Following 
Mojon et al. (2002), we test for this in two steps. First, we estimate if the response to 
monetary policy effects varies with firm size. Second, we assess whether monetary policy is 
more powerful during a downturn as compared with an upturn. The following two equations 
capture it more formally: 
 
it i i t i t i t t i i it e u L i M i S i X IR + + + + + + = * * * 5 4 3 , 1 χ χ χ χ χ .                                      (3a) 
it i t t t t t i i it e u BOOM i RECESSION i X IR + + + + + = * * 4 3 , 1 δ δ δ δ .                                (3b) 
 
Equation (3a) links the corporate interest rates to a vector  it X  of balance sheet indicators and 
three additional explanatory variables. These are  i t S i * ,  i t M i * , and  i t L i * . The variable  t i  is 
a yearly average of two-week repurchase rate (the policy rate of the CNB),  i S ,  i M , and  i L  
are dummy variables for small, medium, and large sized firms (according to assets), 
respectively. It is expected that  5 4 3 χ χ χ f f , that is, that monetary policy effects have the 




                                                             
7 It is noteworthy that piece-wise correlations of these three variables lie between -0.13 and -0.15; thus, the level 
of multicollinearity is likely to be very low. Analogously, multicollinearity is not likely to be an issue when 
estimating Equation (3b).   10
Analogously, Equation (3b) captures the effect of the business cycle on corporate interest 
rates, controlling for balance sheet indicators. The dummy variable  t RECESSION  takes on a 
unit value if economic growth has been negative in a given year. Conversely,  t BOOM  
denotes the dummy variable stating when economic growth has been positive. In our sample, 
the Czech Republic recorded negative year-on-year real gross-domestic-product (GDP) 
growth in 1997 and 1998 (-0.8 percent and -1 percent, respectively). It is further expected that 
4 3 δ δ f , that is, that monetary policy is more potent during downturn. As mentioned, a 
detailed derivation of all the variables is presented in Appendix. 
 
Regarding our econometric strategy, we do not apply dynamic panel data estimators (which is 
typical for this stream of literature) for two reasons: First, if applied, the number of 
observations reduces to about one-third because the time dimension of our sample is rather 
short. Second, the lagged dependent variable was insignificant in all the specifications we 
estimated (not presented here). An additional issue is the eventual severe bias in the estimates 
when dynamic panel data estimators are applied to small samples. Nerlove (2002) emphasizes 
that the Arellano-Bond method is inappropriate when the time dimension of a panel is short. 
In consequence, the estimation of our equations is based on the static panel data models 
accounting for endogeneity of regressors. As the instruments, we use industry and time 
dummies. While industry dummies may capture different risks of industries, time dummies 
may reflect macroeconomic effects.
8 
                                                             
8 As an informal test of the relevance of instruments for endogenous explanatory variables, we ran the „first-
stage“ equations and examined the significance of instruments. In all cases, there were several instruments 
significant. The resulting R-squared varied substantially. It was about 0.1 for balance sheet indicators and 
between 0.2-0.9 for variables including the policy interest rate such as the product of policy rate and small firm 
dummy.    11
 
3. Empirical Results 
In this section, we investigate financial accelerator effects in the balance sheets of Czech 
firms. We first analyze the role of the balance sheet position in explaining corporate interest 
rates. Second, we examine if CNB monetary policy exhibited heterogeneous effects in the 
sample period; that is, if it had a stronger effect on small firms, and during downturn. 
 
The adequacy of our measure of a sample corporate interest rate is examined in Chart 1. We 
compare this interest rate with the aggregate interest rate. Aggregate interest rates are 
calculated as the weighted average of inter-bank interest rates according to their maturity (see 
Appendix for details on construction). The weights are determined by the amount of 
respective outstanding loans. The sample interest rates are well correlated with the aggregate 
interest rates; we believe our sample is likely to be representative. 
 







































Chart 2 presents the distribution of corporate interest rates. It provides evidence of   12
considerable firm heterogeneity concerning interest rates charged by banks. Besides, it seems 
the cross-sectional variation in interest rates depends on the mean corporate interest rate. 
When average rates are higher, the variation increases. This means that firm heterogeneity 
tends to increase during a downturn. Eventually, it suggests that credit conditions worsen 
more than proportionally for certain firms during downturns. For instance, the corporate 
interest rate at the 25
th percentile stands at around 7 percent and increases to 8 percent during 
the downturn, while the corresponding increase at the 75
th percentile is from 12 percent to 18 
percent. Benito and Whitley (2003), using U.K. data, find a similar pattern.  
 












































Note: The chart presents the 25
th, 50
th, and 75
th percentiles of corporate interest rates over time. 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on balance sheet indicators. Generally, the interest rates 
firms pay seem to be relative to firm size, despite the large standard errors. Rates are also 
higher in downturn, in contrast with boom. We seek to explicate this variation in interest rates 
in this paper, focusing specifically on the effects of monetary policy. Next, balance sheet 
indicators differ accross firm size as well. Interestingly, they seem to worsen only marginally 
during downturn.   13
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 






Downturn Boom Total 
Interest  rates  12.04 9.67  8.86 12.88  10.02  10.25 
  (10.17)  (7.05) (8.08) (7.76)  (8.8)  (8.75) 
Net  debt/Assets  0.2  0.25 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.24 
  (0.17) (0.21) (0.22) (0.16)  (0.2)  (0.2) 
Market  access  0.22 0.27 0.32 0.28 0.27 0.27 
 (0.23)  (0.27)  (0.29)  (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) 
Cash  flow/Assets  0.06 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.06 
  (0.1)  (0.14) (0.15) (0.09) (0.14) (0.13) 
Collateral/Assets  0.31 0.34 0.39  0.4  0.34 0.35 
  (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) 
No. of observations  493 493 506 120  1376  1494 
Note: See Appendix for details on construction of variables. Standard deviations in brackets. 
 










1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Equity/Assets Firm-level interest rate
 
 
Chart 3 shows that when internal sources of financing deteriorate, credit conditions are likely 
to tighten. This suggests either the presence of the financial accelerator effect or simply the 
increase of firm’s default risk when internal sources weaken. The ability of a firm to finance 
investment from internal sources is proxied by an equity-to-assets ratio. The credit conditions   14
are assessed simply by the sample mean of the corporate interest rate.  
 
Table 2. Determinants of Corporate Interest Rates 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Net  Debt/Assets  4.99** 2.13 3.98**  3.98*  1.64 
  (2.15) (2.78) (2.11) (2.11) (2.65) 
Market access  -25.1**  -21.5*  -26.54*** -26.54*** -23.35** 
  (10.44)  (11.5)  (10.04) (10.04) (10.88) 
Cash  flow/Assets   -39.13*    -33.35* 
   (20.9)      (20.02) 
Downturn     2.21*    1.98** 
     (0.91)  (0.99) 
Small firms      2.22**   
       (0.92)   
          
Fixed  effects  1.74*** 1.36*** 1.14*** 1.86*** 1.63*** 
R-sqr.  overall  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 
No.  of  observations  1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
   (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Net Debt/Assets    3.20  2.05    
    (2.99)  (2.96)    
Market access  -16.15*  -20.25*  -22.82** -12.71*   
  (9.54)  (11.15)  (10.87) (7.31)   
Cash flow/Assets  -52.85*** -28.17  -29.63    
  (17.52)  (24.16)  (23.37)    
Downturn      1.90* 2.35***  1.92** 
      (1.02) (0.79) (0.83) 
Small firms    8.24  2.98 6.95  10.72* 
    (9.99)  (10.06) (5.50)  (5.63) 
         
Fixed effects  1.45***  1.57*** 1.65*** 2.74***  2.48** 
R-sqr. overall  0.02  0.03  0.08  0.02 0.01 
No.  of  observations  1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parenthesis. Net debt and cash flow are divided by assets (see Section 2.2). 
***, **, and * - denotes significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. See Appndix for the 
details on the construction of variables. 
 
Next, we study how a firm’s balance sheet position affects the level of interest rates the firm 
is charged. We present determinants of corporate interest rates in Table 2 (an estimation is   15
carried out by the IV panel data fixed effects estimator).
9 We report the results for ten various 
specifications together to give some insight into the sensitivity of the estimates. The results 
suggest that, of the balance sheet indicators, market access particularly matters. There is also 
certain evidence that leverage and liquidity influence corporate interest rates. Remarkably, 
collateral has been insignificant in all the specifications, which may reflect difficulties in 
terms of the relationship between economic performance and law enforcement during the 
sample period (see Roland and Verdier 2003).
10 
 
Table 2 also presents determinants of corporate interest rates, toward which we are 
particularly interested in the influence of economic downturn and firm size (i.e., small firms). 
The results indicate that Czech firms paid higher interest rates during economic downturn. 
Small firms seem to pay higher interest rates, since it is more difficult for lenders to monitor 
small entities. However, significant small firm and downturn variables do not necessarily 
imply financial accelerator effects. It may simply reflect the greater risk firms present during 
downturns or the greater risk inherent in small firms, respectively. For this reason, we 
investigate if monetary policy effects propagate more strongly to small firms (or during 
downturns), controlling for balance sheet indicators as a proxy for firm risk. 
 
Table 3 documents the heterogeneous impact of monetary policy on firms. Generally, the 
explanatory variables are significant with the expected signs in all the specifications. 
                                                             
9 In several specifications, the random-effects estimator was consistent, as indicated by a Hausman test. We do 
not report these results for the sake of brevity. We also re-estimated all the specifications bootstrapping standard 
errors. In the majority of the specifications, bootstrapped errors were close to asymptotic standard errors. The 
results are available on a request.  
10 The results with collateral as an explanatory variable are available on a request.    16
Moreover, the value of coefficients is typically stable accross the specifications to a large 
extent. Controlling for the strength of balance sheet indicators, we find that small firms react 
more strongly to monetary policy effects, in comparison to medium and large sized firms. The 
coefficient on the product of repo (policy) rate and the small firm dummy is consistently the 
largest and most precisely estimated. Interestingly, we find weak evidence that monetary 
policy affects the interest rates large sized firms are charged. This may indicate that larger 
firms have closer ties with banks and that, therefore, monetary policy effects are likely to have 
less impact on them. Overall, our results correspond to Vermeulen (2002), who finds that 
financial accelerator effects are strongest for small firms’ investment dynamics in a sample of 
the four largest Euro area countries. On the contrary, the result of Mojon, Smets, and 
Vermeulen (2002) do not suggest that monetary policy effects would be stronger for small 
firms’ interest rates.  
Table 3. Determinants of Corporate Interest Rates -  
Firm Size, Downturns and Monetary Policy 
   1 2 3 4 5 
Net debt/Assets    0.38  -0.62    -2.87 
   (1.86)  (2.06)    (1.87) 
Market Access    -17.02**  -23.36**    -16.08** 
   (8.73)  (10)    (7.75) 
Cash flow/Assets    -9.37  -2.93    -5.52 
   (16.73)  (17.31)    (15.14) 
Repo*Small firm  0.77**  1.01***  0.90**     
 (0.34)  (0.27)  (0.37)     
Repo*Medium firm  0.14    -0.18    
 (0.29)    (0.33)    
Repo*Large firm  0.11    0.61    
 (0.31)    (0.44)    
Repo*Recession       0.29*** 0.5*** 
       (0.09) (0.12) 
Repo*Boom       0.36** 0.75*** 
       (0.17)  (0.22) 
       
Fixed  effects  2.52**  2.33*** 2.37*** 2.64*** 2.93*** 
R-sqr.  overall  0.03 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.12 
No.  of  observations  1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Note: For mnemonics, see Table 2.  
   17
 
Table 3 also displays the results on the asymmetric effect of monetary policy over the 
business cycle. There are several studies investigating the potential asymmetry of monetary 
policy. Using Austrian data for the period 1976–98, Kaufmann (2002) finds that monetary 
policy effects are indeed asymmetric over the business cycle. Similarly, Peersman and Smets 
(2005) find the asymmetric impact of monetary policy on industrial production in the Euro 
area countries.  
 
Contrary to expectations raised in the previous section, our results do not suggest that 
monetary policy is more potent during downturn. Rather it seems that monetary policy effects 
are actually stronger during the boom period, despite that the coefficients on   
t t RECESSION i *  and  t t BOOM i *  are not statistically different. In our opinion, the lack of 
the asymmetric effects of monetary policy may reflect the specificity of the Czech credit 
market during the 1990s. The market was marked by rather soft budget constraints at the 
outset of economic transition and subsequent credit rationing at the end of the 1990s (Hampl 
and Matousek 2000).
11  
                                                             
11 We also examine the heterogeneous impact of monetary policy depending on credit conditions. When credit 
conditions are tight, it is likely that small policy changes trigger a greater reaction in corporate interest rates than 
otherwise. We identify tight credit conditions using the results of Pruteanu (2004a). Pruteanu finds that the 
period 1999:1–2000:12 might be labeled as one of credit rationing, as her empirical results suggest that moderate 
excess demand for bank loans existed then. She argues that excess demand has been a consequence of the 
downturn in 1997–98 and of continuing instability in the banking sector. Following economic recovery, the 
demand for loans increased, though this was not followed by sufficient growth in the loan supply given the lack 
of improvement in issues related to very high level of bad loans in the Czech banking sector. Indeed, our results 
suggest that monetary policy has significantly stronger effects on corporate interest rates in 1999–2000. 
Nevertheless, these results hinges on identification of credit rationing by one particular paper and thus are not 
presented in the text. Nevertheless, they are available on a request. Next, we also investigated if the effect of   18
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examined the determinants of corporate interest rates using a panel dataset 
based on financial statements from Czech firms from the 1996–2002 period. Namely, we 
assessed the relationship between a firm’s financial position and the cost of external 
financing. In addition, we examined if monetary policy has heterogeneous effects on firms 
according to their size and if the response to monetary policy effects is time-varying. 
Examining the heterogeneity of monetary policy effects allows us to assess the presence of 
financial accelerator effects in the Czech economy.  
 
Overall, the results suggest that balance sheet indicators are a vital determinant of corporate 
interest rates. We find that, among balance sheet indicators, market access matter in particular 
(leverage and liquidity matter, to a certain extent, as well). In addition, the strength of balance 
sheet indicators is seem to vary with the firm size. We also find certain evidence of the 
heterogeneous impact of monetary policy effects. Monetary policy has stronger effects on 
small than on medium and large sized firms. Yet, we find no evidence that monetary policy 
effects depend on the business cycle.  
 
To summarize, our results indicate that balance sheet indicators affect the interest rates firms 
are charged by borrowers, and that monetary policy effects propagate unequally across firms, 
suggesting some support for the existence of financial accelerator effects in our sample. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
each of the characteristics of balance sheets on corporate interest rates is more important for small firms and 
during economic downturn, but failed to uncover any systematic differences. These results are also available on 
a request. 
   19
References 
Angeloni, I.; A. Kashyap; and B. Mojon. 2003. Monetary Policy Transmission in the 
Euro Area. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
Arnostova, K., and J. Hurnik. 2005. The Monetary Transmission Mechanism in the 
Czech Republic: Evidence from VAR Analysis. Czech National Bank Working 
Paper Series, No. 4/2005. (available at www.cnb.cz).  
Ball, L., and G. Mankiw. 1994. Asymmetric Price Adjustment and Economic 
Fluctuations. The Economic Journal 104, 247–61. 
Benito, A., and J. Whitley. 2003. Implicit Interest Rates and Corporate Balance Sheets: 
An Analysis Using Aggregate and Disaggregated UK Data. Bank of England 
Working Paper No. 193 (available at www.bankofengland.uk). 
Berg, C.; J. Hansen; and P. Sellin. 2004. The Financial Accelerator and Corporate 
Investment. Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2.  
Bernanke, B.S., and M. Gertler. 1989. Agency Cost, Net Worth and Business 
Fluctuations. American Economic Review 79,14–31. 
Bernanke, B.S.; M. Gertler; and S. Gilchrist. 1999. The Financial Accelerator in a 
Quantitative Business Cycle Framework. In Handbook of Macroeconomics, 
Volume 1, eds. J. Taylor and M. Woodford. Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Boissay, F. 2001. Credit Rationing, Output Gap and Business Cycles.” European 
Central Bank Working Paper Series, No. 87 (available at www.ecb.int). 
Bougheas, S; P. Mizen; and C. Yalcin. 2006. Access to External Finance: Theory and 
Evidence on the Impact of Firm-Specific Characteristics. Journal of Banking and 
Finance 30, 199-227. 
Calstrom, C., and T. Fuerst. 1997. Agency Costs, Net Worth and Business 
Fluctuations: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis. American Economic 
Review 87, 893–910. 
Dhyne, E.; L. Alvarez; H. Le Bihan; G. Veronese; D. Dias; J. Hoffmann; N. Jonker; P. 
Lunnemann; F. Rumler; and J. Vilmunen. 2005. Price Setting in the Euro Area: 
Some Stylized Facts from Individual Consumer Data. European Central Bank 
Working Paper No. 524 (available at www.ecb.int). 
Gertler, M., and S. Gilchrist. 1993. The Role of Credit Market Imperfections in the 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism: Arguments and Evidence. Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics 95, 43–64. 
––––––. 1994. Monetary Policy, Business Cycles and the Behavior of Small   20
Manufacturing Firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 309–40. 
Hanousek, J., and R. Filler. 2004. Investment, Credit Rationing, and the Soft Budget 
Constraint: What Would a Well-functioning Credit Market Look Like? 
Economics Letters 82, 385–90. 
Hampl, M., and R. Matousek. 2000. Credit Contraction in the Czech Republic: The 
Causes and Consequences. Czech National Bank Working Paper Series, No.19 
(available at www.cnb.cz). 
Kashyap, A.; O. Lamont; and J. Stein. 1994. Credit Conditions and the Cyclical 
Behavior of Inventories. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 565–92. 
Kaufmann, S. 2002. Is There an Asymmetric Effect of Monetary Policy over Time? A 
Bayesian Analysis Using Austrian Data. Empirical Economics 27, 277–97. 
Kiyotaki, N., and J. Moore. 1997. Credit Cycles. Journal of Political Economy 105, 
211–48. 
Konings, J.; M. Rizov; and H. Vandenbusche. 2003. Investment and Financial 
Constraints in Transition Economies: Micro Evidence from Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Bulgaria and Romania. Economics Letters 78, 253–8. 
Lizal, L. 1999. Depreciation Rates in Transition Economy: Evidence from Czech Panel 
Data. Prague Economic Papers, 8,261–76. 
Lizal, L., and J. Svejnar. 2002a. Investment, Credit Rationing and the Soft Budget 
Constraint: Evidence from Czech Panel Data. Review of Economics and Statistics 
84, 353–70. 
––––––. 2002b. Financial Conditions and Investment during the Transition: Evidence 
from Czech Firms. In Designing Financial Systems in Transition Economies: 
Strategies for Reform in Central and Eastern Europe, eds. A. Meyendorff and A. 
Thakor, 215–60. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Mojon, B.; Smets, F.; and P. Vermeulen. 2002. Investment and Monetary Policy in the 
Euro Area. Journal of Banking and Finance 26, 2111–29.  
Nerlove, M. 2002. Properties of Alternative Estimators of Dynamic Panel Models: An 
Empirical Analysis of Cross-Country Data for the Study of Economic Growth. In 
Essays in Panel Data Econometrics, ed. M. Nerlove. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Oliner, S., and G. Rudebush. 1996. Is There a Broad Credit Channel of Monetary 
Policy?.  Federal Reserve Board of San Francisco Economic Review No. 1 
(available at www.frbsf.org).    21
Peersman, G., and F. Smets. 2005. The Industry Effects of Monetary Policy in Euro 
Area. The Economic Journal 115, 319–42. 
Pruteanu, A. 2004a. Was There Evidence For Credit Rationing in the Czech Republic? 
Eastern European Economics 42, 58–72.   
Pruteanu, A. 2004b. The Role of Banks in the Czech Monetary Policy Transmission 
Mechanism. Czech National Bank Working Paper Series, No. 3 (available at 
www.cnb.cz). 
Roland, G., and T. Verdier. 2003. Law Enforcement and Transition. European 
Economic Review 47, 669–85. 
Schmitz, B. 2004. What Role Do the Banks Play in Monetary Policy Transmission in 
EU New Member Countries? University of Bonn. Mimeograph. 
Stiglitz, J., and A. Weiss. 1981. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information. American Economic Review 71, 393–410. 
Vermeulen, P. 2002. Business Fixed Investment: Evidence of a Financial Accelerator 
in Europe. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 64, 213–31.    22
 
Appendix. Construction of Variables  
•  it IR  - corporate interest rate for i-th firm,  it it it TDEBT INREX IR = .  it INREX  are 
interest expenses from the profit-loss account, and total debt  ) ( it TDEBT  is a sum of 
noncurrent liabilities and bank loans and borrowings from the balance sheet, all for i-
th firm at time t.  
•  it ACCESS  - market access, measured as 1 minus the ratio of short-term debt to total 
company debt. Short-term debt is the current liabilities from balance sheets. Total 
company debt is calculated as the sum of current liabilities, noncurrent liabilities, and 
bank loans and borrowings from balance sheets. This proxy estimates the extent of 
short-term financing.  
•  it DEBT - net debt of the company.  
•  it CF  - cash flow, generated by the firm is calculated as the sum of the depreciation of 
the tangible and the intangible assets and the net income from profit-loss accounts.  
•  it COLL - collateral value of illiquid assets. We first estimate the depreciation rate as 
follows:  e CAPITAL ON DEPRECIATI it it + + = β α , where  it ON DEPRECIATI  is a 
depreciation of tangible and intangible fixed assets from profit-loss accounts, and 
it CAPITAL  is a sum of tangible and intangible fixed assets from the balance sheets. 
Having estimated the above equation by the fixed-effects estimator, the results 
indicate that annual depreciation rate is 8.3 percent (a simple ordinary-least-squares 
regression yields a value of 8.4 percent). This rate is somewhat higher than findings 
reported by Lizal (1999). Lizal, using comparable methodology, estimates the annual 
rate of depreciation between 4.8 and 5 percent. Some of his alternative specifications 
lead to an estimate of annual depreciation of about 6.3 percent. The data used in 
Lizal’s paper are from the period 1992–95, which may explain the difference in the   23
results. Nevertheless, our result is consistent with the Czech accounting standards 
since the depreciation rate may legally range between 2 and 20 percent. Controlling 
for industry effects influences the estimated depreciation only minimally. As a result, 
we work with a depreciation rate of 8 percent when deriving the value of collateral.   
In this regard, the estimated rate of depreciation is used to compute the collateral value 
of illiquid assets as:  1 , , , ) 1 ( − − + = t i t i t i K I COLL δ , where  t i COLL ,  is the collateral value 
of illiquid assets in i-th firm at time t,  t i I ,  is i-th firms’ investment at time t,  1 , − t i K  is a 
booked value of illiquid assets at time t-1, and δ  is the rate of depreciation as 
computed above. As  1 − − = t t t K K I , the value of collateral is computed finally as 
follows:  1 , , , − − = t i t i t i K K COLL δ . 
•  t RECESSION  - dummy. It takes on a value of 1 when GDP y-o-y growth is negative 
(i.e., 1997 and 1998 in our sample). Analogously, the  t BOOM  dummy has zero value 
when y-o-y growth is positive. 
•  i t S i *,   i t M i *,  a n d   i t L i *  - product of the annual average of two-week repurchase 
rate of the CNB and dummy variables for small, medium-, and large-sized firms, 
respectively. The  i S  dummy takes on a value of 1 when the firm’s assets are smaller 
than the 33rd percentile of the sample. The  i M  dummy takes a value of 1 when firm’s 
assets are between the 33
rd and 66
th percentiles. The  i L  dummy is 1 when firm’s assets 
lies above 66
th percentile. 
•  AIRt - the weighted aggregate interest rate is used for comparison with the sample 
corporate interest rates (see Chart 1). The volume of debt outstanding weights the 
maturity structure of the interest rate for each maturity as follows: 
























= ,               24
 where AIRt is representative aggregate interest rate at time t, stt is the amount of short-
term debt outstanding at time t, mtt is the amount of mid-term debt outstanding at time 
t, ltt is the amount of long-term debt outstanding at time t, sirt is short-term average 
interest rate paid by firms at time t, mirt is mid-term average interest rate paid by firms 
at time t, and lirt is the long-term average interest rate paid by firms at time t.  We use 
data on the monthly interest rates on loan balances and the monthly statements on 
loans and receivables from clients, as collected by the Czech National Bank. Short-
term instruments are labeled those with maturities of less than one year, medium-term 
instruments have maturities between one and five years, and long-term instruments 
have over five years. The data period is January 1996 to December 2002.  
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